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ABSTRACT 
Mandatory imposition of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) since 
31
st
 December 2012 seems to be associated with serious endeavours done by the 
regulators and policy makers to enhance the stakeholder’s value for public listed 
companies in Bursa Malaysia. Besides establishing the code that involved 
independent non-executive directors, the world’s trend for choosing outsiders as 
CEOs becomes familiar amongst family controlled-firms (FCFs) in Malaysia. In 
terms of shareholder and stewardship theories, this latest trend frequently happens in 
FCF with opportunity for expropriation due to the highly persuasive cash flow rights. 
The failure of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group’s (MSWG) roles in 
establishing stakeholder theory motivates this study to investigate the moderation 
effects of CEO choice on corporate governance and FCF performance relationship by 
using ROA, EVA, and Tobin’s Q with the application of signalling theory. FCF 
population for the financial year of 2010 and 2011 were consecutively rated 
accordingly using the MCCG index scores issued by MSWG in 2009. The study 
reveals that CEO choice has moderating positive effects towards the board of 
directors’ structure and FCF’s performance relationship that are significant to 
Tobin’s Q model. After further analysis, it was found that the positive effect comes 
from insider CEOs. Inevitably, the transformation of negative magnitude seems to 
have a synergic impact which combining both CEOs of FCF as a new trend for its 
corporate value and investors’ wealth. Eventually, the present study suggests the 
regulators and policy makers to reconsider specific governance codes for FCF in 
order to lessen the dominance of agency theory. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, CEO choice moderator, MSWG, Family-
Controlled Firm’s performance. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Pengenaan mandatori Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia sejak 31 Disember 2012 
memperlihatkan keseriusan penggubal undang-undang dan pembuat dasar dalam 
meningkatkan nilai tambah pemegang taruh untuk syarikat senaraian awam. Selain 
pengukuhan kod ini terutamanya melibatkan pengarah bebas yang bukan eksekutif, 
terdapat juga kecenderungan untuk memilih orang luar sebagai Ketua Pegawai 
Eksekutif di beberapa buah negara di dunia. Hal ini semakin popular di firma yang 
bersifat ekspropriasi dalam kalangan firma milik keluarga di Malaysia. Hala tuju ini 
yang berpaksikan teori pemegang saham dan teori kebersamaan sememangnya 
berlaku kepada firma milik keluarga yang pemegang saham terbesarnya berupaya 
menghalalkan cara pengambilan aset syarikat yang merugikan pemilik saham 
minoriti. Kegagalan teori pemegang taruh yang dimainkan oleh Badan Pengawas 
Pemegang Saham Minoriti dalam mengimbangi ekspropriasi tersebut menjadi 
motivasi kajian ini. Ini terutamanya bagi menyiasat kesan moderator daripada 
pemilihan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif terhadap hubungan di antara tadbir urus korporat 
dan prestasi firma milik keluarga yang menggunakan pengukuran ‘ROA, EVA’, dan 
‘Tobin’s Q’ melalui pengaplikasian teori isyarat. Populasi firma milik keluarga bagi 
tahun kewangan 2010 dan 2011 diukur berdasarkan penarafan indek Kod Tadbir 
Urus Korporat yang dikeluarkan oleh Badan Pengawas Saham Minoriti pada 2009. 
Kajian mendedahkan bahawa pemilihan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif mengimbangi 
hubungan secara positif ke atas struktur ahli lembaga pengarah dan prestasi firma 
milik keluarga yang signifikan dengan model Tobin’s Q sahaja. Dalam analisa 
tambahan, pemilihan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif dalam kalangan orang dalam 
mempunyai kesan positif. Selain itu, transformasi hubungan langsung bersignifikan 
secara negatif di antara struktur ahli lembaga pengarah dan prestasi firma milik 
keluarga menjadi hubungan bersignifikan positif yang diimbangi dengan kehadiran 
pemilihan Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif sebagai moderator. Ini membuktikan gandingan 
kedua-dua Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif sebagai suatu trend terbaharu yang dapat 
mempertingkatkan lagi nilai korporat firma dan kekayaaan para pelabur firma milik 
keluarga. Penemuan kajian ini mencadangkan agar penggubal undang-undang dan 
pembuat dasar menimbangkan semula aspek Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia 
yang lebih spesifik disebabkan kurangnya kesesuaian pengaplikasian teori agensi 
untuk firma milik keluarga. 
 
 
Kata-kunci: Tadbir-urus korporat, pemilihan ketua pegawai eksekutif, badan 
pengawas pemegang saham minoriti, prestasi firma milik keluarga. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Introduction 
 
Corporate governance has become an important agenda for listed 
companies in any capital market worldwide. The importance can be seen through its 
evolution in several events. Bolton and Rosell (2002) identified the events due to 
corporate governance effects such as the worldwide wave of privatization of the past 
two decades, the pension fund reform and the growth of private savings, the takeover 
wave of the 1980s, the deregulation and integration of capital markets, the 1997 East 
Asia Crisis and the series of recent corporate scandals in the US and worldwide.  
 
The cause of corporate governance effects comes from a stiff competition globally as 
well as rapid changes in technology due to technological advances (Yoshikawa & 
Phan, 2001). Nevertheless, Yoshikawa & Phan (2001) further claimed that price war 
among bigger firms especially public-listed firms requires technological advances in 
order to reduce transaction costs and the costs of information research, rendering 
global competition between capital markets and the evolution of corporate 
governance around the world. 
 
Dynamically, public listed firms in a capital market rely on the evolution of corporate 
governance in order to be more competitive in its respective industry. Basically, 
public listed firms are governed by the law of a country. Internal governance 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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